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TOWARDS A MORE REALISTIC CONCEPTION
OF THE HUMAN (JUDICIAL) ANIMAL
REVIEWING:
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
Bradley W. Joondeph*
INTRODUCTION
For many years, three models of judicial behavior have
dominated the field of political science: the legal model, the
attitudinal model, and the strategic model. As their names
imply, these models posit three different determinants of
judges' decisions: (1) their understandings of what the law
requires, (2) their attitudes (or preferences) about sound
public policy, or (3) the strategic moves they perceive
necessary, in light of various constraints, to best further their
legal or policy preferences. Over the past half century,
scholars have spilled a great deal of ink skirmishing over
which of these models best explains judicial decision-making,
* Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Santa Clara
University School of Law. I am grateful to Lawrence Baum, June Carbone,
David Franklin, Deep Gulasekeram, Susan Morse, Terri Peretti, and David
Yosifon for exceptionally helpful comments during this essay's development; to
several participants on the LAWCOURTS listserv for their thoughtful responses
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especially that of the Supreme Court. And obviously, these
models differ substantially in their conceptions of judicial
behavior. But it is worth recognizing that each model
proceeds from a common premise: A judge's principal
motivation in decision-making is to see her vision of sound
law or policy adopted. Indeed, all three models presume that
this is a judge's exclusive goal.
Lawrence Baum's Judges and Their Audiences challenges
this basic premise.1 Baum readily admits that judges care
about legal policy (whether we characterize it as law, public
policy, or both), and that this interest explains much of their
decision-making, especially at the Supreme Court. But he
argues it is extraordinarily unrealistic to assume that legal
policy is the sole motivation for their behavior. Even at the
Supreme Court, where judges probably enjoy the greatest
latitude to pursue their policy preferences, other powerful
motives come into play, motives common to all human beings.
Relying on a wealth of research from social psychology,
Baum contends that human beings are strongly driven to
maintain and enhance their self-esteem. Moreover, our self-
esteem depends on our social interactions, such that our
perceptions of ourselves turn largely on how others view us
(or, more accurately, how we perceive others view us). As a
result, humans constantly engage in a process of "self-
presentation," consciously and subconsciously managing the
impressions we make on others. And the opinions of those
people with whom we strongly identify-our salient
audiences-are critical to our self conceptions. Baum
therefore argues that a judge's interest in the regard of
salient audiences influences her behavior, including the
content of her decisions.
The basic thesis of Judges and Their Audiences is well
grounded in what psychologists have long known about the
human animal and thus seems unassailable. Of course, one
might nit-pick about some details. For instance, in a certain
sense, Baum may not take his perspective of psychological
realism quite seriously enough. Part of his argument as to
why the dominant models of judicial behavior are unrealistic
is that, because judges can only have a marginal impact on
1. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006).
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legal policy, it would be irrational for them to spend much
time pursuing their policy preferences, especially in a
strategic manner. But research in social psychology
demonstrates that human beings generally have an inflated
sense of control over events in their lives, and that this
illusion of control strongly influences their behavior.
Moreover, many of the shifts in positions that judges might
make in response to various political constraints, as predicted
by the strategic model, could occur subconsciously, rendering
the effort less of a hassle than Baum suggests.
But these are minor quibbles. The essential idea that
Baum advances seems indisputable: Judges, like all human
beings, are endowed with a powerful desire to maintain an
affirming self-concept, and this aspect of their humanity
affects their behavior. Indeed, it seems fantastic to think that
judges are somehow immune from psychological forces that
apparently occupy all of our interiors.
While Judges and Their Audiences offers several insights
important to the field of constitutional politics, two particular
contributions stand out. First, Baum's explanation of how
judges play to certain audiences provides an additional
reason that the prevalent views at the Supreme Court tend to
mirror those of the ascendant national political coalition.
Since Robert Dahl's seminal 1957 article, "Decision-Making
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker,"2 many scholars have contended that the Supreme
Court's decisions generally reflect the values of the governing
political regime. They have pointed to two institutional
arrangements-the process by which justices are appointed to
the Court, and the Court's institutional dependence on the
elected branches-as the mechanisms supporting this
relationship. Judges and Their Audiences alerts us to a third:
Regardless of the ideological preferences the justices bring to
the Court, or any strategic reasons they might have to mind
the views of Congress, the President, or the general public,
the justices' desire to impress their salient audiences will
nudge the Court in the direction of currently ascendant
political values, especially those of the nation's elites.
Second, and more generally, Baum's book points us in the
2. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).
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promising direction of bringing greater psychological realism
to the study of American constitutional development. Social
psychology and related fields can teach us a great deal about
judicial decision-making. In particular, they have
demonstrated that the situational influences on human
decision-making are far more important than we tend to
realize, and that our typical, dispositionist conceptions of
human agency are highly misleading. We are
psychologically primed to attribute decisions to individual
preferences, attitudes, and autonomous choices. But much of
what drives human behavior is unfelt and unseen, forces
lurking in our invisible interiors and in overlooked external
situations. All things considered, the human animal is more
of a "situational character" than a "rational actor."4 Judges
and Their Audiences marks a significant step towards the
incorporation of these insights into our understanding of
judicial decision-making. It expands our field of vision
beyond judges' personal attitudes and preferences about legal
policy to the significant situational influences, both internal
(judges' largely unfelt yearning for self-esteem) and external
(the views of various audiences quite removed from
constitutional adjudication).
Judges and Their Audiences should open a new research
frontier in the field of public law, one devoted to examining
the various situational influences on judicial decision-making.
And this new agenda should lead us to a much more realistic,
finely grained understanding of judicial behavior.
I
A basic premise of the dominant models of judicial
behavior is that a judge's only goal is to shape the content of
3. See, e.g., SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: CORE MOTIVES, IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 7 (2004) ("Social behavior is, to a larger extent than people
commonly realize, a response to people's social situation, not a function of
individual personality."); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT 8 (2007)
("Most of us have a tendency both to overestimate the importance of
dispositional qualities and to underestimate the importance of situational
qualities when trying to understand the causes of other people's behavior."); Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 22 n.69 (2004) ("We are
moved far more by forces that we do not appreciate than we realize and far less
by forces to which we attribute behavior than we realize.").
4. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 22.
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the law, public policy, or some combination of the two. (Baum
refers to these three possibilities collectively as "legal
policy."5) Of course, most scholars who defend these models
would readily admit that, at least on some occasions, other
motives come into play, such as career advancement.6 But
such episodes are generally considered exceptional and
intermittent, at least for unelected judges. Thus, the
dominant models ignore them and assume that judges act
single-mindedly-sincerely or strategically-to pursue their
visions of sound legal policy. This assumption would seem
particularly apt for Supreme Court justices, who apparently
have little else to pursue.
Judges and Their Audiences challenges this conception of
judicial motivation, arguing that it is highly unrealistic. To
Baum, common sense reveals that even the fairly mundane
considerations of everyday life must affect judicial behavior,
even at the Supreme Court. For example, the justices
probably value a pleasant working environment in which they
generally get along with each other. As Baum notes, they
"would be an unusual group indeed if most of them did not
prefer to minimize conflict."7 This felt need to avoid friction
in their professional interactions almost certainly affects
their decision-making, if only in small ways.' Moreover,
judges must consider their workloads in making various
choices.9 For instance, each Supreme Court justice might
conceivably author her own opinion in every merits case
decided by the Court. But no justice since the time of John
Marshall has ever come close to doing so. Why? Even when
the majority opinion or the principal dissent fails to capture a
justice's exact views (as must typically be the case), they
5. See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 1, at 9.
6. For instance, most observers of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit would concede that the behavior of judges J. Harvie
Wilkinson and Michael Luttig was affected by their ambition to win
appointments to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., JAN CRAwFORD GREENBERG,
SUPREME CONFLICT 200 (2007) (discussing the rivalry between Wilkinson and
Luttig in connection with possible appointments to the Court); Deborah Sontag,
The Power of the Fourth, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 9, 2003, at 40.
7. See BAUM, supra note 1, at 12 (citing Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of
Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003)).
8. See id.
9. See RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 123-26 (1995) (describing such
practices as "going-along" voting and the "live and let live" joining of opinions as
prominent examples of behavior that reduces judges' workloads).
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usually decide that writing separately is not worth the effort.
Even the most dedicated justice has other things to do, and
she must draw some line that allows her to pursue those
other objectives.
In the grand scheme of things, judges' interests in
minimizing conflict with their colleagues and managing their
workloads are probably not critical to the Court's role in the
development of American law. But the existence of these
motives nicely illustrates two of Baum's basic points: Judges
necessarily have some goals other than shaping legal policy,
and those goals inevitably influence their behavior. Of
course, if certain influences are trivial or sporadic, there
would be little reason to include them in parsimonious models
of judicial behavior. As Baum acknowledges, a model must
ignore many of the real world's complex details in order to
provide any generalizable explanatory power. A model's
"simplification of reality can be a virtue, because it makes
analytic problems more tractable."10 At some point, though,
the costs of simplification become too great, and the accuracy
of a model suspect. Hence Baum's essential thesis: By
ignoring judges' desire to be liked and respected by various
salient audiences, the dominant models are too unrealistic.
They "implicitly treat one of the most fundamental human
qualities as irrelevant to judges' choices." 1
Judges and Their Audiences is built around three basic
propositions. The first is that "[pleople want to be liked and
respected by others who are important to them." 2 As Baum
explains, humans are highly motivated to maintain and
enhance their self-esteem. We have a basic need "to feel good
about ourselves," ' 3  a need that may be "the most
fundamental" aspect of our humanity. 4  Moreover, "an
individual's self-concept does not develop in isolation from
10. BAUM, supra note 1, at 19.
11. Id. at 22.
12. Id. at 25.
13. BAUM, supra note 1, at 26 (quoting JONATHAN D. BROWN, THE SELF 193
(1998)).
14. Id. at 26. As two psychologists have explained, "in a discipline with few
universally accepted principles, the proposition that people are motivated to
maintain and enhance their self-esteem has achieved the rare status of an
axiom." Mark R. Leary & Deborah Downs, Interpersonal Functions of the Self.
Esteem Motive: The Self-Esteem System as a Sociometer, in EFFICACY, AGENCY,
AND SELF-ESTEEM 123 (Michael H. Kernis ed., 1995) (quoted by BAUM, supra
note 1, at 26).
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other people."15 Instead, a human being's identity is shaped
by the perceptions of others and her sense of those
perceptions: "Even a person's most basic sense of his or her
own existence seems to depend on interactions with others."16
And this fundamental "need for others to validate people's
self-conceptions does not end at some point." 7 Instead, "it
continues throughout life."'
As one might expect, our self concepts are most affected
by the opinions of people with whom we strongly identify. As
Baum explains, people have an innate "need to belong to
some groups and to feel distinctive from other groups,"'" and
our membership or affiliation with these groups shapes our
social identities. We define ourselves largely by the groups to
which we belong (even if those affiliations are quite informal),
such that our identifications with these groups are critical to
our self-concepts.2 ° These social identities, in turn, influence
our self-esteem, as the regard of these salient groups affects
our views of ourselves. That is, human beings are highly
motivated to win the respect and admiration of the people
with whom they identify-the people important to their social
identities.2
Baum's second basic premise is that this desire to be
admired and respected by our salient audiences affects our
behavior.22 Consciously and unconsciously, human beings
behave in ways geared toward making favorable impressions
on others. Psychologists call this "self-presentation" or
"impression management," and it pervades our social
interactions. Some self-presentation is plainly instrumental,
intended "to gain something concrete from an audience," such
as a reward or promotion.23  But much of our self-
presentation-and probably most of it-is personal in nature,
15. BAUM, supra note 1, at 26.
16. RICK H. HOYLE, MICHAEL H. KERNIS, MARK R. LEARY & MARK W.
BALDWIN, SELFHOOD: IDENTITY, ESTEEM, REGULATION 31 (1999) (quoted in
BAUM, supra note 1, at 26).
17. BAUM, supra note 1, at 26.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 27.
20. Id. at 28.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 25.
23. BAUM, supra note 1, at 28. This description would capture the behavior
of Judges Wilkinson and Luttig in their rivalry on the Fourth Circuit. See
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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performed for the sake of "popularity and respect as ends in
themselves, not as means to other ends. 24 It is an essential
part of our drive for self-affirmation: "When people perceive
they have achieved a favorable image with others, that
perception tends to boost their self-esteem."25 What is more,
people tend to internalize the images they present to others,
such that "self-presentation helps people to create their
identities. 26
Third and finally, Baum asserts that, in these important
respects, "judges are people."2  The drive to maintain and
enhance our self-esteem-and our reliance on social
interaction to accomplish this goal-appears to exist in all of
us, particularly in a relatively individualistic society like the
United States.2 As a result, appointment to the bench, even
with life tenure, cannot inoculate judges from these features
of our psychological interiors. Thus, the essential argument
of Judges and Their Audiences is straightforward: The desire
to be liked and respected, particularly by salient audiences,
affects the choices that judges make. They "care about the
regard in which they are held for its own sake," and this
"interest in the esteem of others can be expected to influence
their work as judges."29
To be clear, Baum flatly rejects the notion that judges'
preferences about legal policy are irrelevant. He readily
concedes that judges care deeply about legal policy,
particularly at the Supreme Court; "[p]olitical scientists have
amassed a large body of evidence indicating that Supreme
Court justices seek to make good policy." °  Baum also
concedes that the justices (and other judges) often act
strategically; "[iincreasingly [scholars] are amassing evidence
of strategic action by the justices to secure good policy,
especially in their interactions with other justices."31 Rather,
Baum's point is that the assumption that judges care
24. BAUM, supra note 1, at 29.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 25.
28. See id. at 26 n.1; see also FISKE, supra note 3, at 189-90 (discussing
differences between European-American cultures and East Asian cultures in
their ideas about the self).
29. BAUM, supra note 1, at 32.
30. Id. at 19.
31. Id.
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exclusively about legal policy is too unrealistic.2
Consequently, although "the leading models of judicial
behavior teach us a great deal about why judges do what they
do,"33 their perspective is too narrow. By failing to consider
judges' personal reasons for engaging in self-presentation,
these accounts "miss much of the motivation that underlies
judges' choices."34
To be fair, the existing models do not uniformly ignore
the potential impact of audiences on judicial behavior. In
fact, one could argue that the strategic model is an audience-
based account, at least in important respects. The strategic
model's critical insight is that sophisticated judges will
consider the constraints of their institutional environment in
pursuing their legal policy goals.3 5 These constraints, in some
sense, are no more than salient audiences, groups of people
that have the power to frustrate a judge's legal policy goals.
At the Supreme Court, for instance, they comprise a justice's
colleagues, the Congress, the President, and the general
public. A strategic justice is motivated to please these
audiences, or at least to avoid alienating them, because each
could potentially derail the justice's ultimate policy objectives.
To Baum, the problem with the strategic model's
attention to audiences is that it assumes the justices' motives
are purely instrumental: Judges take into account the views
of various groups only "as a means to advance their goal of
achieving good legal policy."36  In contrast-and this is
probably the book's most distinctive claim-Baum contends
the justices "care about the regard in which they are held for
its own sake."37 They like being liked because it makes them
feel good about themselves, regardless of the impact it might
32. Id. at 20 (the empirical evidence "does not establish that justices are
motivated solely (or even overwhelmingly) by policy goals").
33. Id. at 21.
34. Id. at 29.
35. For some classic works in this tradition, see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS
OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); Lee Epstein & Thomas G. Walker, The Role of
the Supreme Court in American Society: Playing the Reconstruction Game, in
CONTEMPLATING COURTS 315 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game,
79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991).
36. BAUM, supra note 1, at 22.
37. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
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have on their capacity to shape legal policy."
And if judges seek admiration for its own sake, the
audiences that matter-and how much they matter-will
differ from what the strategic model predicts. An audience's
influence will turn not just on its capacity to frustrate a
judge's policy goals, but also on its importance to the judge's
social identity. In fact, Baum argues that a judge's purely
personal interest in the approval of audiences will likely hold
more influence than a judge's instrumental motives, at least if
they are not subject to election. 9 Thus, Baum contends that
Congress, the President, and the general public likely have a
smaller impact on judicial decision-making than scholars
generally presume.4 ° While these audiences "are significant
reference groups for some judges,"41 "the most consequential
audiences are likely to be those with the greatest relevance to
judges' social identities, audiences whose bases for influence
are chiefly personal rather than instrumental."42
One audience important for both strategic and personal
reasons is a judge's colleagues on the same court. As a
strategic matter, they are critical for the obvious reason that,
at least on multi-member courts, a judge needs to win the
votes of her colleagues for her legal position to prevail. But
colleagues also "function as a true peer group, people who
share the same position and work in the same situation,""
and they are the people with whom a judge typically interacts
on a daily basis. Colleagues are thus a critical audience for
assessing a judge's professional acumen and personal
likeability. As a result, judges are apt to behave in ways that
promote favorable impressions with their colleagues, even
when doing so might sacrifice aspects of their legal policy
goals. "Judges who deal regularly with their co-workers and
professional colleagues are unlikely to treat those people
solely as votes to be won."44 For instance, if the stakes are
low enough, a Supreme Court justice might join a majority
38. Of course, this behavior is still apt to produce results that judges
generally fimd amenable, as they are likely to share the policy views of their
salient audiences, a point Baum readily acknowledges.
39. See id. at 87.
40. Id. at 86.
41. Id. at 163.
42. Id. at 87.
43. BAUM, supra note 1, at 54.
44. Id. at 56.
[Vol:48532
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opinion (or refrain from writing a separate concurrence or
dissent) to avoid annoying a colleague. As Baum concludes,
judges "want colleagues to perceive them as cooperative, as
good team players,"4" and their desire for such esteem can
eclipse their interest in getting a decision that completely
reflects their legal policy preferences.
Another audience Baum believes exerts a strong
influence on judicial behavior-an audience entirely ignored
by the strategic model-is a judge's social groups. By this,
Baum means the people a judge associates with in her
personal life: family, close friends, and personal
acquaintances. These people are typically the most
significant to a person's social identity and self-concept.4 6
And because these groups "are so integral to people's sense of
themselves, people have strong incentives to please members
of these groups and to avoid alienating them."47
Furthermore, given the frequency and intensity of judges'
interactions with them, "family, friends, and acquaintances
have ample opportunity to influence a person's ways of
thinking about the world, including politics and public
policy."4
As Baum acknowledges, the influence of a judge's social
groups suggests that judicial decisions may
disproportionately reflect the values of America's social and
cultural elite. Judges generally, and federal judges
particularly, tend to come from affluent, highly educated
backgrounds, and they "usually have highly educated
spouses, friends, and acquaintances."49 For instance, Baum
notes that nearly half of the federal judges appointed between
1993 and 2004 were millionaires.5 0 If the opinions of these
judges' social groups influence their thinking, judicial
decisions will reflect the views of a cross-section of America
quite different from the nation's population as a whole.
(Consider, in this regard, the Supreme Court's relatively
recent decisions in Texas v. Johnson,51 holding that laws
45. Id. at 57.
46. Id. at 117 (a person's "self-esteem depends heavily on their perceptions
of what these audiences think of them").
47. Id. at 89.
48. Id.
49. BAUM, supra note 1, at 90.
50. See id.
51. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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prohibiting the burning of the American flag violate the First
Amendment, and Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe,52 which invalidated a school policy permitting student-
led prayers at high school football games.) Baum therefore
argues that there was more than a grain of truth to Justice's
Scalia's complaint in Romer v. Evans53 that, by invalidating
Colorado's anti-gay Amendment 2, the majority "impos[ed]
upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class
from which the Members of this institution are selected ...
"54
Still another important judicial audience is fellow
lawyers: other judges, law professors, and the practicing bar.
Lawyers matter to judges because, as research shows,
"[p]eople within any occupation orient themselves toward
others in the same occupation."" Some of this is likely due to
the frequency of their interaction; judges often speak with
lawyers face-to-face, inside and outside the courtroom. But
more of it is probably attributable to "the sense of a shared
situation and a shared expertise."56 As Baum explains, their
common occupation means that "[1]awyers are the most
regular and most expert critics of the judges' work, a role that
enhances the importance of their esteem to judges."57
This is especially true of lawyers who have become fellow
judges. Though a judge's immediate colleagues on her own
court are likely her most salient professional audience, judges
on other courts are probably next on the list. They share the
judge's special status, and they do the same work. What is
more, "judges have good opportunities to assess the work of
other judges, especially because written opinions provide a
basis for assessment that is readily available and widely
read.""8
Also significant, says Baum, are the opinions of legal
academics. Law professors are "prominent evaluators of
judges' work," and because of their prestige, "their
evaluations of judges carry considerable weight."59
52. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
53. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
54. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. See BAUM, supra note 1, at 97.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 98.
58. See id. at 103.
59. See id. at 100.
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Professors' law review articles, books, and other commentary
can strongly influence the enduring perceptions of a judges'
reputation. Further, "law professors control sources of
judicial satisfaction such as publication of opinions in
casebooks and opportunities to lecture at law schools"-items
that, at least for some judges, "constitute significant
rewards ."60
Baum contends that these social and professional
audiences are typically the most important to judges, and
thus most likely to influence their decision-making. But he
argues at least two other audiences are worth considering:
policy groups and the media. Baum defines policy groups as
"sets of people who share particular policy positions or
ideological orientations."6' These groups might be organized
as formal organizations, such as the Federalist Society or the
American Constitution Society, or they may be "informal and
less clearly defined,"62 people who generally share certain
political beliefs or ideological commitments. In either case,
they can operate as important reference groups for a judge,
such that "the judge has an incentive to take actions that
those people approve. 63 Often judges have developed ties to
groups before taking the bench; Justice Ginsburg, for
instance, worked for the ACLU's Women's Rights Project for
several years before her appointment to the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit.6 4 And judges frequently interact with
policy groups after joining the judiciary; Justice Thomas, for
example, has spoken at events sponsored by groups like the
Federalist Society, the American Enterprise Institute, the
Heritage Foundation, and the Eagle Forum.65 Of course,
because judges can pick the policy groups with whom they
associate, these groups' independent influence on judges'
choices might be small. But, as Baum explains, they may
well work to "reinforc[e] judges' preexisting tendencies, so
that judges support a group's interests more consistently than
they would otherwise."66
60. See id.
61. BAUM, supra note 1, at 118.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 119.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 134.
66. Id. at 121.
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The last audience Baum considers is the news media.
Baum contends that the media's opinion might be personally
important to judges for two reasons. First, the media is a
conduit to other important groups.67 Other than the judges'
families and close friends, people learn about their work
through coverage in the press. Thus, media portrayals of
judicial decisions are critical to the impressions judges can
make on many of the groups important to their social
identities. Second, "what the news media say can be
important to judges in itself, so that the media constitute a
distinct judicial audience."6 8  Media coverage typically
provides judges immediate feedback on their work, and they
must derive some enjoyment from reading positive
performance reviews, regardless of the impact those reviews
have on other audiences. These two different motives for
garnering favorable press coverage will usually be
intertwined, and "[t]his intertwining magnifies the impact of
judges' concern with their portrayals in the media."69 It is
unsurprising, then, that archival research has uncovered
evidence that Supreme Court justices have been keenly
interested in media portrayals of the Court, or that justices
have made various efforts to ingratiate themselves with
journalists. °
This apparent interest in laudatory press coverage,
particularly among Supreme Court justices, has not gone
unnoticed. Indeed, many commentators claim that some of
the justices have grown more liberal over their tenures on the
Court due largely to their thirst for the admiration of a left-
leaning national media. Thomas Sowell termed this the
"Greenhouse effect," named after the longtime New York
Times correspondent, Linda Greenhouse.71 Scholars have
generally scoffed at a supposed Greenhouse effect, perhaps
because it sounds like a scapegoating of the media by
disappointed conservatives. But Baum takes the idea
seriously. For if the basic thesis of Judges and Their
67. BAUM, supra note 1, at 135.
68. See id. at 136.
69. See id. at 139.
70. See id. at 137.
71. Thomas Sowell, Blackmun Plays to the Crowd, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 4, 1994, at B7; see also Mark Tushnet, Understanding the
Rehnquist Court, 31 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 197, 199-200 (2005).
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Audiences holds water, the existence of a Greenhouse effect
would be unsurprising. That is, if the national media is
indeed a salient audience for some justices, and if the media
is generally liberal in its political orientation, we would expect
a justice's interest in the media's approval "subtly to move the
judge to the left."72
Baum therefore examines the question empirically. In
fine, the Greenhouse effect hypothesis is that Republican
Supreme Court appointees-and specifically, those who are
newcomers to Washington, D.C.-will become more liberal
over their time on the Court. Baum therefore divided the
universe of justices appointed between 1953 and 1995 into
three groups: (1) Republican appointees who were new to
Washington, (2) Republican appointees with significant
experience in Washington before joining the Court (and thus
not expected to drift ideologically under the Greenhouse effect
hypothesis), and (3) Democratic appointees (who were
presumably already liberal at the time of their
appointments). He examined the justices' votes in civil
liberties cases, coding them as either liberal or conservative,
and compared their records in their first two terms on the
Court to those in periods later in their tenures.73 If the
Greenhouse effect is real, the Republican newcomers should
have voted more liberally in the later periods than in their
first two terms on the Court, and the change in their voting
records should have been more pronounced than that of the
other two groups.
Sure enough, Baum's findings were consistent with the
existence of a Greenhouse effect: "In each analysis the
Republican newcomers as a group showed substantial
increases in their support for civil liberties claims between
their first two terms and the later periods, about ten
percentage points on all measures.7 In addition, the change
for Republican appointees new to D.C. differed from that for
established D.C. Republicans or Democratic appointees, both
of whom remained more consistent ideologically.75 "Thus the
Republican newcomers as a group stand out, and the
72. BAUM, supra note 1, at 142.
73. Specifically, Baum used terms five through ten and seven through ten of
the justices' tenures on the Court. See id. at 143-44 & n.23.
74. See id. at 146.
75. See id. at 147-48.
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differences between them and the other justices are highly
significant statistically." 6 To be sure, these findings alone do
not establish the existence of the Greenhouse effect.77 But, as
Baum concludes, "the hypothesis of a Greenhouse effect
should not be dismissed out of hand. Judges want the
approval of individuals and groups that are salient to them,
and their interest in approval may affect their judicial
behavior.""
What are the ultimate implications of this audience-
based approach to judicial behavior? Baum identifies four.
First, it can provide much of the motivational basis for the
existing models of judicial decision-making. That is, the
desire to win favor with a variety of salient audiences helps
account for why judges actually care about legal policy, a fact
the dominant models assume without explaining.79 Second, it
offers a new perspective from which to evaluate the ongoing
debates in law and political science about the respective
influences of legal doctrine, the judges' policy preferences,
and the strategic calculations dictated by institutional
constraints.80  For instance, concern for the respect and
admiration of fellow judges, legal academics, and the
practicing bar could explain why judges often appear to care
so much about legal doctrine, even to the detriment of their
apparent policy preferences.8 1  Third, an audience-based
perspective might explain judicial behavior that does not fit
well within the existing models, such as writing books and
articles or sitting for interviews.8 2 Though we could conjure
some strategic rationales for these actions, the more
straightforward explanation is that they are acts of personal
self-presentation. Finally, taking audiences into account
76. See id. at 146.
77. For instance, these justices' ideological drift might have been the
product of influences other than the media, their votes alone may not accurately
capture their true ideological positions, or Baum's findings might be the product
of random chance. See id. at 151.
78. BAUM, supra note 1, at 151.
79. See id. at 22-23, 158-59.
80. See id. at 23.
81. See id. at 160.
82. Id. at 175 ("Judges write books and articles that do not advance a policy
agenda. They talk about pending cases in ways that jeopardize their
participation in those cases. They write colorful opinions to attract attention,
and they write opinions announcing they are unhappy with the decisions they
have reached.").
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"points to some new lines of inquiry into judicial behavior,"
such that "the scope of empirical research on the bases for
judges' choices can be expanded."83
Of course, attempting to measure the impact of audiences
on judicial behavior presents some methodological challenges,
as Baum readily concedes. The salient audiences for each
judge will likely differ,8 4 so it will be difficult to identify the
relevant groups, their substantive viewpoints, or their
relative significance. This is particularly true for the groups
Baum contends are the most consequential: a judge's family,
friends, and personal acquaintances. Moreover, isolating the
independent impact of audiences will be challenging, as the
views of a judge's most salient audiences are apt to be quite
similar to her own preexisting ones. 85 But these empirical
hurdles do not warrant abandoning the effort. As Baum puts
it, "eschewing the study of personal audiences for more
tractable issues would be something like the choice of the
man in the old joke who searches for his car keys not where
he lost them but where the light is better."86 In the end, "a
conception of judging as self-presentation can help in our
progress toward a better comprehension of judicial
behavior.""
II
On balance, it is hard to find much fault in Baum's
argument. Social psychologists have amply demonstrated
that human beings are motivated to maintain and enhance
their self-esteem or the possibility of self-improvement, a
motive sometimes called "self-enhancement." 8 As a leading
text in the field explains, "[a]ll else being equal, people
basically like to feel good about themselves; they like to feel
83. Id. at 23.
84. BAUM, supra note 1, at 48.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 49.
87. Id. at 175.
88. See FISKE, supra note 3, at 22; see also David Dunning, On the Motives
Underlying Social Cognition, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: INTRAINDIVIDUAL PROCESS 348, 354 (Abraham Tesser & Norbert
Schwarz eds., 2001) ("If there is any theme that emerges again and again in
social psychology it is that the [human being] is a prideful one."); Roy F.
Baumeister, The Self, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 680, 695
(Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998) ("it is
clear that self-esteem is quite important to people").
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that they are good and lovable." 9 Positive feedback gives us
an instant sense of gratification.9" Thus, as Susan Fiske and
Shelley Taylor have concluded, people "are heavily influenced
by the need to feel good about themselves and to maintain
self-esteem."91
Moreover, the regard we have for ourselves depends
heavily on our social interactions and our sense of how others
perceive us.9 2 As Mark Leary has written, "the primary
determinants of self-esteem involve the perceived reactions of
other people, as well as self-judgments on dimensions that
the person thinks are important to significant others."93
Consequently, "the self-esteem system is inherently sensitive
to real and potential reactions of other people. 94  Indeed,
events that are either known (or potentially knowable) by
others "have much greater effects on self-esteem than events
that are known only by the individual."9 5  And this
relationship between self-esteem and social interaction is
nested within another, even more fundamental human
motive: the need to belong.96 The drive for belonging (or,
conversely, for avoiding social exclusion) underlies the need
for approval from others, and it seems to constitute an
essential evolutionary adaptation. As Susan Fiske has
89. FISKE, supra note 3, at 22 (citation omitted); see also ERNEST BECKER,
THE STRUCTURE OF EVIL 328 (1968); JONATHON D. BROWN, THE SELF 193
(1998) (there is "a basic human need to feel good about ourselves"); Hanson &
Yosifon, supra note 3, at 94-95; Jennifer Crocker & Lora E. Park, Seeking Self
Esteem: Construction, Maintenance, and Protection of Self-Worth, in HANDBOOK
OF SELF AND IDENTITY 291 (Mark R. Leary & June Price Tangney eds. 2003);
Mark R. Leary & Deborah Downs, Interpersonal Functions of the Self-Esteem
Motive: The Self-Esteem System as a Sociometer, in EFFICACY, AGENCY, AND
SELF-ESTEEM 123 (Michael H. Kernis ed., 1995).
90. See FISKE, supra note 3, at 22.
91. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 212 (2d ed.
1991).
92. See, e.g., Roy F. Baumeister, The Self, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 88, at 682 ("the self is an interpersonal being");
Kristin Renwick Monroe, A Paradigm for Political Psychology, in POLITICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 399, 400 (Kristen Renwick Monroe ed. 2002) ("it is the actor's
perceptions of self in relation to others" that matters).
93. Mark R. Leary, Making Sense of Self-Esteem, CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE (1999); see also FISKE, supra note 3, at 188 ("people
(many Americans at least) seem to strive for self-enhancement in the sense of
wanting to see themselves and be seen in a positive light").
94. See Leary, supra note 93.
95. Id.
96. See FISKE, supra note 3, at 17.
97. See id. at 10-11.
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explained, people "seek social acceptance precisely because of
social motives that have evolved to help them survive in
groups-and to survive more generally."9"
Because these are essential features of the human
animal, people are more or less constantly engaged in a
process of presenting themselves to others, consciously and
unconsciously, 99 in ways intended to make favorable
impressions. 100 This self-presentation is the means by which
people "convey their preferred self-concept.' 10 Most
prominently, people present themselves in ways that seek
ingratiation ("behavior to promote being liked") and self-
promotion ("the goal to be seen as competent"), 10 2 modes that
directly serve the motives of self-enhancement and group
belonging. In general, it is the rare circumstance when
human behavior is wholly unaffected by a concern for the
perceptions of others, particularly along the dimensions of
likeability and competence. We are "social to the core."103
To be sure, human beings vary in the attention they
devote to the perceptions of others. Some of us are "high self-
monitors," people who "are much more likely to do, not what
they personally prefer, but what is necessary in the situation:
what other people need for them to do or what is
appropriate."'0 4 Others are "low self-monitors," people whose
"attitudes guide their behavior more than for other people
because they do what they believe in, what they want to do,
and what they like."105 The judiciary surely includes a range
along this spectrum. While Justice O'Connor always seemed
well attuned to her reputation and image, 10 6 for instance,
Justice Souter often seems oblivious. 0 7  Still, these
98. Id.
99. See Tanya L. Chartrand & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Motivations:
Their Activation, Operation, and Consequences, in SELF AND MOTIVATION:
EMERGING PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 13-41 (Abraham Tesser, Diederik A.
Stapel & Joanne V. Wood, eds., 2002).
100. See generally MARK R. LEARY, SELF-PRESENTATION: IMPRESSION
MANAGEMENT AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR (1995).
101. FISKE, supra note 3, at 206.
102. Id. at 206, 208.
103. Id. at 13.
104. Id. at 211-12.
105. Id. at 211.
106. See JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 298 (2005) (describing how
O'Connor "managed her public image carefully").
107. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE
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differences are matters of degree. Every person's self-concept
"depend[s] in part on the people around them,""'8 such that
we all perform various acts of conscious and subconscious
self-presentation. 1 9 Indeed, even the apparent decision to
ignore the perceptions of others is itself a form of self-
presentation. (Consider Justice Thomas's quite conscious
decision not to ask any questions at oral argument.) Thus,
"[w]ith varying degrees of self-consciousness, people perform
in ways intended to give other people the impression they
seek." n0
And because these are core aspects of our being-the
product of evolutionary adaptation-there is little reason to
think judges are somehow immune from their influence. In
fact, as Baum suggests, judges may rate well above average
in their desire for esteem and respect."' In general, "those
who seek and accept public positions are especially interested
in the esteem that winning and holding prestigious positions
provides."" 2 To become a judge, candidates must either
campaign for an elected position or ingratiate themselves
with various power brokers for an appointment, and those
who take the bench have typically traded a higher earning
potential for a public position with greater deference and
prestige. It would therefore be unsurprising if, as a group,
judges are higher self-monitors than the average person.
Most important, Baum's argument seems to provide a
better explanation than any of the existing models for a range
of judicial behaviors. Consider, for example, how judges often
state publicly that they find the policy implications of their
own decisions distasteful, as on these three recent occasions:
* In Lawrence v. Texas,"' Justice Thomas voted to uphold
Texas's law prohibiting gay sodomy. But he noted in his
dissent that the law was "uncommonly silly," that were he "a
member of the Texas Legislature, [he] would vote to repeal
it," and that "[plunishing someone for expressing his sexual
preference through noncommercial consensual conduct with
SUPREME COURT 43 (2007) (describing some of Souter's eccentricities).
108. BAUM, supra note 1, at 27.
109. See id. at 30.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 30-32.
112. Id. at 31.
113. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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another adult does not appear to be a worthy way to expend
valuable law enforcement resources."114
* In Gonzales v. Raich,"' Justice O'Connor voted to
invalidate the federal Controlled Substances Act as applied to
persons who grow marijuana at home for their own medicinal
use, conduct recently made legal under state law by a
California ballot initiative and a statute enacted by the state
legislature. Yet, she wrote in her dissent that, had she been
"a California citizen, I would not have voted for the medical
marijuana ballot initiative; if I were a California legislator I
would not have supported the Compassionate Use Act."11 6
* Justice Stevens authored the Court's majority opinions
in Raich and Kelo v. New London,"7 both of which the Court
handed down in June 2005. But in a speech before a county
bar association only three months later, he stated that the
government's actions in each case produced "results that I
consider unwise," and that "the law compelled a result I
would have opposed if I were a legislator."1 18
The question is not why these justices voted as they did,
or why they decided to write dissenting opinions or speak
outside the Court, actions that might have several
explanations. Rather, the question is why they went out of
their way to disavow the policy consequences of their
decisions. Could these statements have somehow been
strategic, aimed at furthering their long-term legal policy
objectives? Perhaps. But it seems highly improbable, at least
as a complete account. For instance, how would the public's
knowledge of O'Connor's policy preference to illegalize all
marijuana possession actually have affected her ability to
shape legal policy, particularly when she knew she would
retire within a year? The more straightforward explanation
is that O'Connor considered this information important to the
image she thought most attractive. To her, the statement
said something significant about her commitment to
federalism as a constitutional principle, and her willingness
to reach results that she believed the law dictated, even when
they contradicted her policy preferences.
114. Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
116. Id. at 57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
118. Matt Labash, Evicting David Souter, WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 13, 2006.
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As a second example, consider the willingness of several
Supreme Court justices to speak with journalists about the
inner workings of the Court. As an institution, the Court
guards its secrets jealously. Leaks are almost unheard of,
and clerks are required to sign oaths of confidentiality
forbidding them from disclosing any non-public
information. 9 Yet, in interviews not for attribution, the
justices themselves have shed light on some of the Court's
most private details. For instance, several justices were
important sources for Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong in
writing the book The Brethren."' And just recently, several
justices spoke to Jeffrey Toobin for his book The Nine. 2 ' Both
books revealed unflattering information about the justices,
and thus diminished the Court's mystique, an importance
source of its power. Though the authors may not have
gathered the embarrassing information from the justices
themselves, the justices' participation plainly lent credibility
to the books' accounts. Why, then, did the justices agree to be
interviewed when doing so could only serve to undermine the
Court's authority? Again, we might conjure some strategic
rationales, but they seem rather far-fetched. The most logical
explanation is that the justices sought to impress various
audiences-to spin some of the defining events of their
judicial careers in ways that promoted certain impressions.
As a third example, consider judges who express their
views in particularly flamboyant or colorful ways. Exhibit A
would be Justice Antonin Scalia. Scalia is wont to use his
written opinions, opinion announcements, and questions at
oral argument to mock his colleagues' views, often in a biting,
sarcastic tone. Of course, Scalia is highly intelligent, and
surely he understands, at least on some level, that this
behavior does more to alienate his colleagues than to build
prevailing coalitions.' But being recognized as the smartest
119. See Peter B. Rutledge, Clerks, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 370-71 (2007)
(book review); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of
Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 959 (2007) (book
review).
120. BOB WOODWARD & SCoT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 3 (1979).
121. TOOBIN, supra note 107, at 342.
122. Indeed, there is evidence that Scalia's bullying drove away his most
important potential ally in creating winning coalitions, Justice O'Connor. See
GREENBERG, supra note 6, at 82 (reporting that Scalia's personal attacks
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kid in the room often seems more important to him than
winning cases.123
Many (including Baum 124) have made this point before,
pointing to some of Scalia's more famous dissenting opinions,
such as those in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services125
and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,126 as exemplars. But high-
profile decisions addressing politically charged issues like
abortion may be unrepresentative. More telling, I think, is
Scalia's behavior when the stakes are relatively low, such as
in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.127 At issue in
Crosby was a Massachusetts law that forbade all state
entities from contracting with any person (including business
organizations) that did business with or in the nation of
Myanmar. 28 The Supreme Court unanimously decided that
the existing federal sanctions against Myanmar preempted
the Massachusetts law, with most of the justices finding the
legislative history behind the federal sanctions quite
instructive. 129 Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned the majority
opinion to Justice Souter. Knowing Scalia would object to the
use of legislative history, Souter relegated his discussion of it
to the opinion's footnotes. 3 °
But this effort at accommodation was not enough to avoid
a rather belittling, disrespectful concurrence from Scalia.
The first five paragraphs of Scalia's brief, four-page opinion
were structured nearly identically, almost like a grade-school
lesson repeated on a chalkboard. Each paragraph began with
a sentence that started, "It is perfectly obvious on the face of
the statute that . . . ," and concluded with a point relevant to
the opinion. 3' The second or third sentence of each
paragraph then stated, "I therefore see no point in devoting a
footnote to the interesting (albeit unsurprising) proposition
"push[ed] ... O'Connor away by offending her"); see also BISKUPIC, supra note
106 at 279 (reporting that "Scalia's comments got under O'Connor's skin").
123. Scalia's willingness to join the Court's per curiam opinion in Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam), stands as an obvious counter-example.
124. See BAUM, supra note 1, at 37.
125. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
126. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
127. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
128. See id. at 366-68.
129. See id. at 373-74.
130. See id. at 375 n.9, 376 n.11, 377 n.12, 378 n.13, 380 n.15, 381 n.16, 382
n.17, 385 n.23.
131. Id. at 388-90 (Scalia, J., concurring).
545
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
that . . ." and finished with an observation that the
legislative history corroborated the relevant point.13 2
Following these five paragraphs, Scalia summed up his
argument with this:
In a way, using unreliable legislative history to confirm
what the statute plainly says anyway (or what the record
plainly shows) is less objectionable since, after all, it has
absolutely no effect upon the outcome. But in a way, this
utter lack of necessity makes it even worse-calling to
mind St. Augustine's enormous remorse at stealing pears
when he was not even hungry, and just for the devil of it
("not seeking aught through the shame, but the shame
itself").133
Again, it is conceivable that Scalia's approach contains
some strategic logic, part of a broader scheme to move the
Court towards his legal positions. But the more likely
explanation is that these sorts of rhetorical flourishes have
cultivated a particular reputation among certain audiences,
one Scalia very much enjoys.
Of course, none of these episodes involved matters
central to the Court's mission. But that is beside the point.
Each illustrates that impressing various audiences motivates
the justices-so much so that, in some instances, this drive
for personal approval will apparently overshadow their
interests in shaping legal policy. And if this motive can
occasionally trump the justices' other goals, there is every
reason to believe it affects how the Court discharges its other,
more significant responsibilities. Indeed, the most logical
inference is that the motive to win the approval of important
audiences is a pervasive influence on the justices' decision-
making.
132. Id.
133. 530 U.S. at 391 (quoting The Confessions, Book 2, T 9, in 18 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 10-11 (1952) (E. Pusey transl. 1952).
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III
In the main, then, the thesis of Judges and Their
Audiences seems spot on: Judges are highly motivated to be
liked and respected by others, and this desire inevitably
influences their decision-making. That said, a few parts of
Baum's argument are not entirely persuasive. Again, one of
Baum's essential points is that judges care about more than
the content of legal policy. But in making this point, Baum
may portray the existing models of judicial behavior as less
realistic than they actually are. Interestingly, and perhaps
ironically, Baum may have overlooked some important
insights from research in social psychology, the field on which
Judges and Their Audiences heavily relies. This research
gives us reason to believe that judges are more apt to adjust
their views in response to various political constraints than
Baum suggests.
In laying the groundwork for his audience-based
perspective, Baum contends that we should be skeptical about
the strength of legal policy goals as a motive for judicial
behavior, and particularly about judges' willingness to engage
in strategic behavior.13 4 First, Baum notes that judges face
several collective action problems in their attempts to shape
legal policy. Appellate judges cannot act alone, but instead
require the collaboration of their colleagues (whose support
they need for their favored outcomes) and judges on other
courts (on whom they must rely to abide by the court's
precedent). 135 What is more, judges depend on a variety of
actors outside the legal system for their decisions to have any
force, something that is hardly guaranteed. As Baum
observes, "research on the implementation of judicial
decisions has underlined the central role of nonjudicial actors
in shaping the ultimate impact of decisions."136 Thus, Baum
concludes, "[w]hatever benefit judges derive from the state of
public policy in a particular field, the choices of a single judge
ordinarily have only a marginal impact on the totality of
policy." 137
134. BAUM, supra note 1, at 17.
135. Id. at 15 ("An appellate judge faces limits imposed by the actions of
colleagues and other courts.").
136. Id. at 15-16.
137. Id. at 15.
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At the same time, argues Baum, strategic behavior can
require a nearly Herculean effort from judges.' 3  As an
example, Baum describes the task of a fully strategic
Supreme Court justice in a case of statutory interpretation:
To estimate whether the current Congress would override
a prospective decision is an intricate task, and some of the
intricacy is reflected in the complex ideological models
that scholars have used to make their own estimates ....
[Moreover,] Congress can reverse a court decision at any
time. So the justice who is committed to avoiding
overrides must estimate the ideological composition and
political environment of future Congresses .... Another
complication is obvious but sufficiently daunting that
students of judicial behavior generally ignore it: since
individual justices differ in their policy preferences, they
need to consider each other in developing strategies aimed
at Congress .... Finally, because the Court can respond to
congressional overrides and shape their effects, the
conscientious justice needs to calculate outcomes in a
multistage game. 139
As Baum explains, a person's willingness to act
strategically is generally a function of two variables: (1) the
strength of her incentives, and (2) her capacity to identify and
follow an appropriate strategy. 140  To Baum, the incentives
here are relatively weak; the benefits that redound to a judge
from good legal policy are merely "symbolic or psychic,"' 4 ' and
judges have only a "limited capacity to affect outcomes. '"4
And given the complexities described above, a judge's ability
to identify and follow the appropriate strategy is highly
questionable. Consequently, the assumption that judges act
strategically "is better treated as a possibility rather than a
certainty.' '4 3 Indeed, Baum argues that the strategic model
assumes judges are "more Vulcan than human, " 144 akin to the
character Mr. Spock from Star Trek:
138. See id. at 18 & n.16. The reference is to the name given to the ideal
judge by Ronald Dworkin in his classic work of legal theory, LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986).
139. BAUM, supra note 1, at 16-17 (citations omitted).
140. See id. at 15.
141. Id. at 11 n.10.
142. Id. at 16.
143. Id. at 160.
144. Id. at 20.
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These judges court exhaustion with their arduous and
often futile efforts to advance their conceptions of good
policy, efforts they expend only for the personal
satisfaction of trying to improve public policy. This is a lot
to expect of them. People often behave in ways that are
not strictly self-interested. Even so, by standards of
ordinary behavior the fully strategic judge seems
enormously altruistic. 145
In essence, Baum argues that it is typically irrational for
most judges to make the effort to act fully strategically. And
he has a point. It may be irrational, at least in traditional
economic terms, for judges to spend much time and energy in
the strategic pursuit of their preferred legal policies. But
there are some important complications here.
First, even if courts have a limited institutional capacity
to effectuate major social change, their decisions have a
significant impact on legal policy. In the United States, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on most questions of legal
interpretation. Other power holders have effectively
delegated these questions to the courts, and elected officials
are generally content with whatever results the judiciary
produces. From the scope of ERISA's preemption provision to
the proper application of the dormant Commerce Clause,
judges typically have the final say. Granted, courts are
constrained in important ways. The judiciary depends
institutionally on the elected branches of government, and
therefore lacks the power to resolve highly salient questions
on its own. Some examples include the Supreme Court's
futile attempts to protect the Cherokee Indians in Georgia, to
prohibit Congress from regulating slavery in the territories,
and to force the South to desegregate its public schools. But
such issues are hardly the ordinary diet of American law. In
the typical run of cases, judges-and particularly Supreme
Court justices-have more than a marginal impact on
American legal policy.
Second, even if the judiciary's impact on legal policy were
only marginal, as Baum contends, judges almost certainly
would still believe their impact was more substantial. Social
psychologists have long known that human beings tend to
have an exaggerated sense of their control over events around
145. BAUM, supra note 1, at 18.
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them. Research demonstrates that the motive to control,
much like the needs to belong and to enhance one's self-
esteem, constitute a core aspect of our beings.146 "Needing
control, wanting to be effective, is an early, basic motive even
in young infants."1 47  This motive for control relates to our
need to feel good about ourselves, as the feeling of efficacy or
making an impact is quite self-affirming. 4 1 "[T]he motive to
control encourages people to feel competent and effective in
dealing with their social environment and themselves." 49
Indeed, people who "consistently feel that they are in control.
may be healthier, feel happier, and live longer. "150
This basic motive to control leads human beings to
believe that they "exercise more control over their
environments than they actually do."' That is, the drive to
maintain a sense of control "is so powerful, and the feeling of
being in control so rewarding, that people often act as though
they can control the uncontrollable." 52  Countless
experiments demonstrate the point. Consider these results
from experiments involving coin tosses: Subjects who believed
they correctly predicted a series of coin tosses tended to see
themselves as good (rather than just lucky) guessers; forty
percent of subjects believed they could improve the accuracy
of their guesses through practice; and twenty-five percent of
subjects stated they would guess more accurately if they were
not distracted. 53 Or consider this: People are more confident
that they will win a dice toss when they are allowed to throw
the dice, and people will wager more money on dice that have
not been tossed than on dice that have been tossed but have
not been revealed. 5 1 Or this: People are more confident that
146. FISKE, supra note 3, at 20.
147. Id. at 21.
148. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 91.
149. FISKE, supra note 3, at 20.
150. Id.
151. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 96.
152. DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 22 (2006).
153. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 96-97 (discussing Ellen J.
Langer & Jane Roth, Heads I Win, Tails It's Chance: The Illusion of Control as a
Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a Purely Chance Task, 32 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 951 (1975)).
154. GILBERT, supra note 152, at 22 (discussing D.S. Dunn & T.D. Wilson,
When the Stakes Are High: A Limit to the Illusion-of-Control Effect, 8 SOC.
COGNITION 305 (1990), and L.H. Strickland, R.J. Lewicki & A.M. Katz,
Temporal Orientation and Perceived Control as Determinants of Risk Taking, 2
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they will win the lottery when they choose their own
numbers. 15 5  Obviously, none of this is rational. But it
demonstrates the power of our motive to control-or, more
accurately, to maintain a feeling of control-and how that
motive distorts our perceptions of reality.
Hence, regardless of what political scientists might
demonstrate through regression analyses or historical case
studies, judges surely believe their decisions have more than
just a marginal impact on legal policy. The core motive to
maintain a feeling of control or efficacy will generally cause
judges to have an exaggerated sense of their own impact.
And if judges believe their decisions shape the law, they will
have a stronger incentive to act strategically than Baum
presumes, even if their beliefs are empirically unfounded.
Finally, the behavior predicted by the strategic model-
judges' adjusting their positions to those more likely to
prevail in light of various political constraints-may be less
laborious than Baum suggests. Baum is surely right that
strategic action is "more difficult and time-consuming than
acting sincerely."'56 By definition, strategic behavior involves
conscious calculations about political possibilities, both
current and future. But the institutional constraints
highlighted by the strategic model might also cause judges'
sincere preferences to change, if only subconsciously.
Consider again a Supreme Court justice in a case of statutory
interpretation. The justices are politically aware; they read
the newspapers and generally have a sense for the political
winds. Moreover, like all people, they do not enjoy seeing
their views publicly rejected-by their colleagues, Congress,
the President, or the general public. Part of this aversion, as
Baum argues, relates to their self-esteem. But part of it
probably relates to an attachment to their preexisting
preferences and a desire simply to win. Seeing one's views
prevail is another way in which people can feel efficacious.
Consequently, a justice may subconsciously abandon
aspects of her views she realizes have no chance of adoption,
and subscribe to views that she believes more likely to
prevail. She need not consider the precise ideological pivot
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 143 (1966)).
155. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 97 (discussing Ellen J. Langer,
The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 (1975)).
156. BAUM, supra note 1, at 160.
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points in Congress or the Executive Branch, or predict several
steps ahead in a multi-stage game. Her legal policy
preferences could shift only subtly, and outside her cognition,
to incorporate her rough sense of changing political realities.
Such behavior would not technically be strategic, as there
would not be a gap between her "true," conscious preferences
and her observable actions. But her behavior would
nonetheless track what the strategic model would predict:
Her choices would be shaped by the constraints posed by the
surrounding political environment, and they would be driven
by the justice's desire to see the closest approximation of her
original policy preferences adopted into law.
In each of these respects, then, the expectation that
judges will act in ways consistent with the strategic model
may be more realistic than Baum contends. But again, this is
a rather minor criticism. Baum's larger point rings true: A
desire to shape legal policy surely does not exhaust judges'
motivations. We know people care about the approval of
important audiences, and we know judges are people. It thus
stands to reason that the motive to gain the admiration of
salient audiences affects judges' decision-making. As Baum
asks rhetorically, "[wihy would judges' interest in approval
not affect their choices?" 157
IV
The final matter to address is the ultimate significance of
Baum's argument. What contributions does Judges and
Their Audiences make to the field of constitutional politics?
Though there may be several, I believe two stand out. First,
Baum has identified another explanatory mechanism that
bolsters the "political systems" or "regime politics" approach
to understanding Supreme Court decision-making. That is,
Judges and Their Audiences presents another reason that, as
an empirical matter, the Supreme Court's decisions tend to
reflect the views currently ascendant on the national political
scene. Second, and more fundamentally, Judges and Their
Audiences marks a significant step in the direction of
bringing greater psychological realism to the study of judicial
decision-making. Specifically, it recognizes the importance of
situational influences on human behavior, influences
157. BAUM, supra note 1, at 22 (emphasis added).
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facilitated by features of the human mind that are largely
unfelt and unseen. In this respect, Baum may have launched
a promising new research agenda in the field of public law,
one that will lead to host of fresh insights into judicial
behavior.
A
In his pathbreaking 1957 article, "Decision-Making in a
Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,"
Robert Dahl wrote that, "the policy views dominant on the
[Supreme] Court are never for long out of line with the policy
views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the
United States."158  Recently, a number of scholars have
modified and refined Dahl's basic thesis, loosely forming a
school of thought known as the "government systems" or
"regime politics" approach to Supreme Court decision-
making. The basic idea-reflected in the work of political
scientists like Terri Peretti, Mark Graber, Howard Gillman,
and Keith Whittington, and law professors like Michael
Klarman, Barry Friedman, L.A. Powe, and Mark Tushnet-is
that the Court is embedded within the nation's political
system, not above or outside it. Though the Court certainly
exercises independent judgment on a case-by-case basis,
developments external to the Court shape its ideological
direction.159 Stated differently, those forces that currently
dominate American politics typically construct the Court's
power and substantive views. As a result, the Court tends to
function more as a policy-making partner of the ascendant
political majority-or at least an influential segment of that
majority-than as an independent check on the political
process.
History is replete with examples. To oversimplify a bit,
the Taney Court's jurisprudence, and particularly its decision
in Dred Scott,160 was a direct extension of the values
animating the Jacksonian political regime that had
158. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).
159. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 6 (2004) ("Judges
are part of contemporary culture, and they rarely hold views that deviate far
from dominant public opinion.").
160. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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dominated American politics since the 1830s.16 1 The Supreme
Court of the late 1930s and 1940s effectively cemented the
central priorities of FDR's New Deal coalition into
constitutional doctrine, particularly in its federalism and Due
Process Clause decisions, which virtually eliminated the
judiciary's role in reviewing the propriety of economic
regulation.'62 The Warren Court's decisions of the 1960s in
the areas of race discrimination, civil liberties, voting rights,
and criminal procedure generally reflected the consensus of
political elites during the Great Society, a coalition comprised
of non-southern Democrats and liberal Republicans.163 And
the Rehnquist Court's recent spate of federalism decisions
seemed to reflect the commitment of the post-Watergate
Republican Party to limit the breadth of Congress's
regulatory powers, at least at its margins.
Of course, the point should not be overstated. 4 As
Howard Gillman has explained, the evolution of
constitutional law "never quite works out as a simple story of
judges merely acting as faithful 'agents' in service of their
'principals.' 1 65 There are several points of slippage between
the constitutional views of the governing regime and those of
the justices, and a variety of circumstances can create the
political space for the Court to act independently. For
instance, the nation's governing coalition is often fractured,
either because different political parties hold control of
Congress and the presidency, or because the majority party,
though controlling both elected branches, is split internally. 66
And because of the lengthy tenure of the justices, there may
161. See Mark A. Graber, Popular Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy,
and the Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 923 (2006).
162. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and the National Political Order:
Collaboration and Confrontation, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 117, 118 (Ronal Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
163. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICS (2000); Howard Gillman, Party Politics and Constitutional Change:
The Political Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 138, at 145-58 (Ronal Kahn & Ken I.
Kersch eds., 2006); Tushnet, supra note 162, at 121-24.
164. For some insightful, cautionary points about the regime politics
approach, see Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The
Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law School, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 511
(2007).
165. Gillman, supra note 163, at 141.
166. See Keck, supra note 164, at 517; Tushnet, supra note 161, at 131.
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be a substantial time lag between a political movement's
electoral victories and its ideological control of the Court. For
these reasons and others, the Court rarely moves in lockstep
with the partisan agenda of any political party.'67 Still, the
basic institutional arrangements of American government
make it unlikely that the Court will diverge too far from the
views currently ascendant in American politics, at least on
issues of high salience. 168  Stated differently, the
constitutional views of the governing coalition are more likely
than any others to be embraced by the Court, even when
other results may be possible.
To date, scholars have generally identified two
explanatory mechanisms that account for this relationship, at
least during ordinary periods of constitutional development.
The first is the appointments process: nomination by the
president and confirmation by the Senate. 169  Presidents
167. See Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game):
Interpretive Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-
Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES 65, 70 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) ("while
there are some notorious examples of the Court retreating in the face of
external pressure from other powerholders, there is still reason to believe that
the justices are not particularly concerned with the possibility that their
decisions might be overturned or that their jobs might be in jeopardy"); Keck,
supra note 164, at 533 ("In most cases that reach the Supreme Court, every
conceivable decision would be supported by some powerful political actor, and
we could always then conclude that the decision happened because the actor
demanded it.").
168. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 159, at 449 ("the Court's constitutional
interpretations have always been influenced by the social and political contexts
of the times in which they were rendered"); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST
DEMOCRATIC BRANCH? How THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 185 (2006) ("the
Supreme Court has followed the public's views about constitutional questions
throughout its history, and on the rare occasions that it has been even modestly
out of line with popular majorities, it has gotten into trouble"); J. Mitchell
Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics
of Federalism, 2 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 233, at 236 (the Supreme Court's
"decisions are influenced by specific patterns of party politics, partisan electoral
realignments, and control of national electoral institutions," such that "even
when the justices adhere to 'principled' jurisprudence and follow constitutional
norms, the meaning of such principles will, over time, reflect changes in the
substantive values of the national political regime"); Richard Primus, Bolling
Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 1021-25 (2004).
169. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN AND JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT:
THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 132 (2005); TERRI JENNINGS
PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 100 (1999); Jack M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045, 1066-70 (2001).
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select Supreme Court nominees based largely on their
perceived constitutional ideology, and Senators cast their
confirmation votes for much the same reason. ° Thus, the
constitutional views represented on the Court tend to match
those that recently prevailed in national elections. No doubt,
the translation is imperfect. Openings at the Court are often
the result of serendipity, so national elections do not always
count equally; the presidential election of 1936 gave FDR the
opportunity to appoint five new justices, for example, while
Jimmy Carter did not appoint a single justice.171 Moreover,
regardless of where they start, justices can drift ideologically,
either because their views evolve or because the relevant
issues change, presenting questions that the appointing
president could not have anticipated in evaluating the
nominee's views.7 2 As a general matter, though, "most
justices, most of the time, satisfy the ideological and policy
expectations of their appointing presidents. "173
The second mechanism tending to affiliate the Court with
the governing regime is that highlighted by the strategic
model: the Court's institutional dependence on other
constitutional actors for its effectiveness. 4  Stated simply,
the Court is impotent in the face of determined political
opposition-from Congress, the President, the lower courts, or
the general public. Without at least the tacit cooperation of
these other actors, the Court's decisions are largely
irrelevant. To cite just one example, the Court in 1954 held
in Brown v. Board of Education 75 that racial segregation in
public education was unconstitutional. But eleven years
later, ninety-nine percent of African-American children in the
170. See PERErI, supra note 169, at 84-101.
171. See LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G.
WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
DEVELOPMENTS 253-54 (3d ed. 2003) (Table 4-1).
172. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal,
Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How
Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007).
173. PEREIrI, supra note 169, at 130; see also LEE EPSTEIN AND JEFFREY A.
SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 132
(2005) ("More often than not, [justices] vote in ways that would very much
please the men who appointed them.").
174. See PERETTI, supra note 169, at 133-51; Barry Friedman, The Politics of
Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 295-329 (2005).
175. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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deep South still attended completely segregated schools.176
Not until Congress enacted major civil rights legislation, and
the Justice Department began suing school districts for
noncompliance, did meaningful desegregation start to
occur. 177
The Supreme Court's vulnerability is a product of the
basic institutional arrangements of American government.
.Congress can adjust the Court's jurisdiction, alter the number
of justices, reduce the Court's appropriations, or even propose
constitutional amendments to overrule the Court's
decisions. 178  The President can disregard the Court's
decisions or choose to enforce them only half-heartedly. 179
Lower courts can effectively disobey the Court, stretching and
squeezing its precedent in ways that suit their own ends.8 0
And the general public can decide to ignore the law or to find
ways to undermine it.'' Granted, such acts of defiance or
retribution against the Court are relatively infrequent. But
they all have happened, and the justices know this history.
To be clear, the Court clearly exercises a great deal of
power. As discussed earlier, the other branches have
delegated most matters of legal interpretation to the
judiciary, leaving the Court a wide swath of autonomy to
resolve these issues however it pleases. But on matters of
high political salience, the Court's institutional position
prevents it from straying too far from society's prevailing
views. Moreover, the appointments process generally ensures
the justices will not be inclined to stray, and instead will be
ideologically disposed to embrace the governing regime's
constitutional vision.
176. See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 50 (1991) (Table 2.1).
177. Id. at 42-57.
178. See PERETTI, supra note 169, at 137-44.
179. See id. at 144-47.
180. See Friedman, supra note 174, at 295-308; Tracey E. George & Albert
H. Yoon, The Federal Court System: A Principal-Agent Perspective, 47 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 819 (2003).
181. Consider the Court's relatively recent decision in Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe, 530 U. S. 290 (2000), in which the justices held that a
public high school's policy of permitting student-led prayers before football
games violated the Establishment Clause. Two months later, thousands of
people were openly praying at high school football games throughout the South,
some in a manner that was probably permissible under the letter (but not the
spirit) of the Court's ruling, some in open defiance. See David Firestone, South's
Football Fans Still Stand Up and Pray, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2000.
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Judges and Their Audiences makes a critical contribution
in supplying a third explanatory mechanism-in addition to
the appointments process and the Court's institutional
dependence-to support the political regimes theory.
Namely, because the justices care about the approval of
various audiences, and the views of those audiences will tend
to reflect current political sentiments, the justices' views will
naturally move towards the nation's prevailing values,
especially those of the country's political and cultural elite.
Regardless of the justices' constitutional ideologies when they
take the bench, the desire to maintain and enhance their self-
esteem will generally push them towards the views of their
salient audiences, views that will reflect the current political
mores of American society. And because the justices' most
influential audiences are disproportionately affluent and well
educated, these views will often reflect the values of the
nation's socioeconomic elites.
By way of example, consider Justice Thomas's views with
respect to the constitutional issues raised by the so-called
"war on terrorism." In the cases thus far decided by the
Supreme Court, such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld is2 and Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, is3 Thomas has taken an expansive view of the
President's executive and commander-in-chief powers, the
broadest on the Court.1 8 1 Most participants likely did not
consider Thomas's views on executive power at the time of his
nomination and confirmation to the Court, and Thomas
himself probably had not thought about the issues in great
detail before recently. Imagine, then, that Vice President
Gore won the presidential election in 2000, and it was the
Gore administration that claimed an expansive set of
executive powers in response to the attacks of September 11,
2001. Imagine that a Republican Congress resisted some of
these claims, and issues like the appropriate use of
Guantanamo Bay or the designation of American citizens as
"enemy combatants" carried a very different partisan valence.
Under these circumstances, would Thomas have adopted
such a strongly pro-executive interpretation of the
Constitution? Of course, there is no way of knowing. But it
182. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
183. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
184. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2823-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 579-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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seems plausible that Thomas would have approached the
issues differently, that he would have seen the relevant
sources of constitutional law through a slightly different lens.
In other words, it is conceivable that Thomas was subtly
drawn to the positions he embraced because they reflected the
constitutional vision of several groups important to his
identity, such as the Federalist Society, the Republican Party,
and cadres of conservative lawyers in the Bush
Administration, including some of his former law clerks.18 5
In any event, the larger point is that the justices' interest
in the approval of salient audiences should generally operate
to push the Court towards the currents of the prevailing
political mainstream. More specifically, Judges and Their
Audiences explains how the views of the justices are apt to
evolve in ways that reflect the emerging political priorities of
the groups with whom the justices most strongly identify.
And over time, like the appointments process and the Court's
institutional dependence, this should generally move the
Court closer to the nation's ascendant political views, or at
least an influential aspect of them.
B
Judges and Their Audiences also makes a more
foundational contribution to our understanding of
constitutional politics: It points us in the direction of bringing
greater psychological realism to the study of judicial decision-
making. The major intellectual contribution of social
psychology has been to identify the significance of social
situations to human behavior.18 6  As Susan Fiske has
explained, "[slocial behavior is, to a larger extent than people
commonly realize, a response to people's social situation, not
185. It is probably worth noting that John Yoo, the lawyer in the Department
of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel responsible for shaping much of the Bush
Administration's legal positions with respect to the "war on terrorism," and
Steven G. Bradbury, who has headed the Office of Legal Council since 2005 and
who authored a series of legal opinions authorizing harsh C.I.A. interrogation
techniques, both clerked for Justice Thomas. See University of California,
Berkeley, School of Law - Boalt Hall, Faculty Profiles, John Choon Yoo,
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/profiles/facultyProfile.php?facID=235 (last
visited Feb. 11, 2008); Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S.
Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at Al.
186. FISKE, supra note 3, at 6.
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a function of individual personality."187 When we observe the
behavior of others, we tend to attribute their actions to their
individual dispositions-their attitudes and preferences-a
tendency that is a product of our core motives to understand
and control.' 8 "As long as people can believe that behavior
represents people's intentions, goals, attitudes, and
personalities, then we can believe that people are predictable,
which makes them more understandable, as well as more
open to our influence."8 9
But this automatic, intuitive mode of causal attribution is
"in important ways and to significant degrees, wrong."9 ° It
reflects what social psychologists have termed the
fundamental attribution error: the "general tendency to
overestimate the importance of personal or dispositional
factors relative to environmental influences."' 9 ' Human
behavior is often much more the product of situational forces
than an individual's attitudes or preferences. 92 Consider a
study David Yosifon called "canonical" in illustrating the
phenomenon. 93  Experimenters asked three groups of
seminary students to deliver a sermon on a selected topic at a
location on the other side of the seminary's campus. 9 4 They
told one group to hurry, as they were already late; one group
that they were expected in just a few minutes; and one group
that they were not expected for some time but should arrive
early. 95  On the walk to deliver the lecture, each of the
seminarians was confronted with a man lying on the ground
(an experimental collaborator) who appeared hurt and in
need of assistance. 9 6  Only ten percent of the seminary
students in the first group (the "high hurry" condition) and
187. Id. at 7.
188. Id. at 114-19.
189. Id. at 115.
190. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 20-21.
191. FISKE, supra note 3, at 112.
192. Id. at 112-13.
193. Posting of David Yosifon, Thinking the Situation into Legal Theory: The
Promise of Experimental Parable, to The Situationist,
http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/02/08/thinking-the-situation-into-
legal-theory-the-promise-of-experimental-parable/ (Feb. 8, 2007).
194. See John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, "From Jerusalem to Jericho". A
Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J.
PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 100, 100-08 (1973).
195. Id. at 103-04.
196. Id. at 104.
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only forty-five percent in the second group ("medium hurry"
condition) stopped to help.197 But sixty-three percent of the
students in the last group ("no hurry") stopped to offer
assistance. 198 The situation (how hurried the students felt)
was far more important in determining their actions than
their individual attitudes or personalities. 99
Other well-known experiments have similarly
documented the dramatic impact of social situations, often in
unsettling ways. In Philip Zimbardo's Stanford Prison
Experiment, several otherwise normal and well-adjusted
college students became sadistic and abusive when cast in the
role of prison guards, so much so that Zimbardo was forced to
cancel the experiment after less than a week.2 °° In an
elaborate series of experiments, Stanley Milgram showed
that, under certain conditions, more than ninety percent of
his subjects were willing to administer dangerously high
electric shocks to fellow subjects as punishment for missing
questions on a meaningless quiz, merely because the person
conducting the experiment instructed them to do so.2"1 What
is more, by simply tweaking a few aspects of the situation,
Milgram saw the percentage of persons willing to administer
such shocks dwindle to ten percent.2 2 Indeed, so many
studies have established the point that it is beyond serious
question. "[Slocial psychology shows, over and over, that the
social situation, not just unique personality, dramatically
controls people's behavior."2 3 And as observers of human
behavior, we underestimate the importance of the situation
and mistakenly attribute others' conduct to their perceived
preferences, attitudes, and personalities.
The reason social situations can be so powerful, and that
we systematically underestimate their significance, is that,
contrary to our conscious experiences, we are often moved by
197. Id. at 105.
198. Id.
199. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture,
152 U. PENN L. REV. 129, 171-72 (2003) (discussing the Darley & Batson study
and its implications).
200. See generally ZIMBARDO, supra note 3, at 194-228.
201. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974); see also
ZIMBARDO, supra note 3, at 266-76 (discussing Milgram's experiments); Hanson
& Yosifon, supra note 199, at 150-53.
202. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 3, at 272.
203. FISKE, supra note 3, at 7.
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unfelt features of our cognitive interiors. Jon Hanson and
David Yosifon have termed this the interior fundamental
attribution error: We tend "to 'see,' and to attribute a powerful
causal role to certain salient features of our interior lives that
actually wield little or no causal influence over our behavior,
while simultaneously failing to see those features of our
interiors that are in fact highly influential."2 °4  We
subjectively experience our own behavior as a product of our
thinking, our preferring, our willing, and our choosing. For
instance, we feel ourselves reading various sources of the law,
thinking about their implications, preferring a particular
interpretation, and acting on that interpretation. But "our
thinking is not what we experience it to be."2"5 Our "cognitive
processing is not simply the stuff of conscious thinking"2 6;
instead, it is highly influenced by a broad range of unseen
features of our mental interiors, influences of which we are
entirely unaware, and which are often highly responsive to
aspects of the social situation.
Indeed, this is precisely the process that Judges and
Their Audiences describes. An important cognitive feature of
the human animal is the need for self-affirmation, and
specifically the need for approval from people who are
important to one's social identity. This core motive, in turn,
makes an aspect of the external situation-the views of
various people in our lives-far more important in
determining our behavior than we tend to appreciate. These
situational influences constantly shape our behavior, but we
remain largely oblivious to their impact. We experience our
actions as the product of thinking, preferring, and choosing,
but our conscious experiences are highly misleading.
Critically, the motive to maintain and enhance one's self-
esteem is only one of many features of our cognitive interiors
that profoundly affect our behavior. Another powerful
drive-and one that may be particularly relevant to judicial
behavior-is the need for "system justification." Human
beings desperately want to see their world as a just place,
where people "get what they deserve." As Marvin Lerner has
explained, people yearn for "a pattern to events which
204. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 25.
205. Id. at 33.
206. Id. at 32.
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conveys not only a sense of orderliness or predictability, but
also the compelling experience of appropriateness expressed
in the typically implicit judgment, 'Yes, that is the way it
should be.' 207 Thus, we tend to blame people for unfortunate
circumstances or events (for instance, those accused of
crimes, people living in poverty, racial minorities, and even
the victims of sexual assault), and to believe that those who
fare well deserve their positions. As Hanson and Yosifon
have noted, "we tend to attribute bad outcomes to individual
dispositions, because it is generally more comforting to
presume that it is the person who was bad, rather than the
situation."20 8  Or, as John Jost and Orsolya Hunyady have
explained, human beings have a strong desire to "justify and
rationalise the way things are, so that existing social
arrangements are perceived as fair and legitimate, perhaps
even natural and inevitable."2 9 We are strongly motivated to
"affirm the status quo, and we will subconsciously alter
our attitudes and perceptions of events to conform to that
desire. In fact, this motivation is so strong that it often
overcomes our desire to affirm ourselves.211  For example,
experiments have shown that disadvantaged groups, such as
low-income Latinos and African-Americans, tend carry
enhanced levels of system justification-that is, they are
more likely to believe that the government is run for the
benefit of everyone, and that existing income inequalities are
"legitimate and necessary. "212
Yet another important motive is to cohere, or to avoid
cognitive dissonance. Many studies have demonstrated that
human beings will alter their attitudes or preferences to
produce a consonant view of the world or of themselves. For
example, a classic experiment involved subjects who
performed a mindless task of moving pegs around a board.21 3
207. MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL
DELUSION vii (1980).
208. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 102.
209. John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, The Psychology of System Justification
and the Palliative Function of Ideology, 13 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 119
(2002).
210. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 103.
211. Id. at 103-04.
212. Id. at 104 (quoting Jost & Hunyady, supra note 209, at 143).
213. See Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of
Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1959), available at
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Festinger.
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After completing the task, some of the subjects were paid $1
and others were paid $20. Ironically, the subjects paid only
$1 described the peg-moving as being much more interesting
than did those who were paid $20.214 For those paid only $1,
the money could not justify the time they spent on a tedious
task. To eliminate the incongruity, then, they changed their
attitudes about the task.215 "People change their attitudes
and reduce their dissonance specifically by adding consonant
or subtracting dissonant cognitions, as well as minimizing the
importance of dissonant ones." 22" And they tend to do so
without any awareness that their beliefs or attitudes have
actually changed. More broadly, our dispositionist tendencies
prime us to see human actions (including our own) as the
product of preexisting, coherent attitudes or preferences-the
expressed will of the actor. But often our actions come first,
automatically, with our attitudes or preferences shifting to
accommodate our actions.217  Thus, a justice might
subjectively experience his vote in a particular case as the
inexorable product of his constitutional theory, the conscious
application of his theory to the facts at hand. But the vote
may well occur first, with the constitutional theory subtly
(and subconsciously) modified to fit the result.
These are just a few examples. Many other aspects of the
human mind undoubtedly influence judicial decision-making,
and in ways that we generally have not appreciated. We are
highly motivated to control, to belong, to understand, and to
trust. We rely on a range of heuristics, or mental short-cuts,
that are often highly misleading. We depend on biased
knowledge structures and stereotypes in our perceptions of
new events and in our recollection of old ones. The list goes
on.
And again, what makes these features of the human
214. Id. at 203.
215. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 108-09.
216. FISKE, supra note 3, at 232.
217. As Daniel Wegner has explained, "the brain structure that provides the
experience of will is separate from the brain source of action." DANIEL M.
WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 47 (2002). As a result, "the
experience of consciously willing an action is not a direct indication that the
conscious thought has caused the action." Id. at 84; see also Hanson & Yosifon,
supra note 3, at 133 ("our experience of will-our familiar experience that our
will is responsible for our conduct-is often not a reliable indicator of the actual
cause of our behavior").
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animal much more powerful than we appreciate is that they
generally operate outside our consciousness. For example, if
we asked Justice Thomas whether the views of his friends in
the Bush administration influenced his votes in Hamdi and
Hamdan, he assuredly would say no.218 And there would be
no reason to doubt his sincerity, at least in terms of how he
experienced his decision-making. But Justice Thomas, like
all of us, is largely blind to how his mind actually works; he
has no way of knowing whether these groups may have
affected his choices. We are blind about what moves us to
action, and because we feel ourselves being moved by our
conscious thinking and preferring, "we are blind to our
blindness."21 9
For too long, the dominant strands of scholarship on
judicial behavior have largely ignored these insights.220 Both
the attitudinal and strategic models effectively assume that
judges are rational actors, individuals who pursue their legal
policy objectives, sincerely or strategically, through conscious
choices that reflect their personal preferences or attitudes.
But the human animal is not really a rational actor.22'
Individual attitudes and preferences about law and policy are
undoubtedly relevant to predicting judicial behavior, but so is
218. As evidence, consider Thomas's claim that politics had "[ziero" influence
on the justices in their decision of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: How THE COURT DECIDED THE
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 172 (2001).
219. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 34.
220. Of course, there are some important exceptions. See, e.g., H.W. PERRY,
JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (1991); C. K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1996); LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPREME COURT (2006); Eileen Braman & Thomas E.
Nelson, Mechanism of Motivated Reasoning? Analogical Perception in
Discrimination Disputes, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 940 (2007); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 777 (2001); Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Human Decision
Makers: An Individual-Level Analysis of the Search and Seizure Cases, 48 J.
POL. 938 (1986). Particularly noteworthy was a recent conference organized by
David Klein (a political scientist) and Greg Mitchell (a psychologist and law
professor) at the University of Virginia entitled "Exploring the Judicial Mind: A
Workshop on Psychology and Judicial Decision Making." See
http://faculty.virginia.edu/judging/index.htm. Discussion papers from the
conference-including one authored by Baum on judicial motivation-are
available for download at the following web site:
http://faculty.virginia.edu/judging/papers.htm.
221. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 3, at 22.
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the situation. And in many cases, situational influences may
be far more important in determining judges' actions than
their personal dispositions.
This is what makes Judges and Their Audiences such a
valuable contribution to the field of judicial politics: It rejects
the dispositional premises of the dominant models and moves
us into a realm of greater psychological realism. By
demonstrating how a judge's motive to enhance her self-
esteem can affect her behavior, Baum has pointed us towards
an exploration of how the mind's unseen interior can move
judges to action in ways we have traditionally overlooked.
This is a critical advance. For if we seek a more realistic
account of judicial behavior, we need a more a realistic
account of human beings.
CONCLUSION
On December 12, 2000, the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Bush v. Gore,222 declaring unconstitutional the
process for recounting ballots that had been ordered four days
earlier by the Florida Supreme Court. In holding the recount
unconstitutional, and that, as a matter of Florida law, the
time for further recounts had run out, the Court's decision
ensured that George W. Bush would receive Florida's
electoral votes.223 A day later, Vice President Gore announced
the end to his ongoing legal challenges and conceded the
presidential election to Bush. 224 Thirty-eight days later, Bush
was sworn in as the forty-third president of the United
States.25"
Throughout the 2000 presidential campaign,
commentators speculated about the election's importance to
the future of the Supreme Court.226 Given the advancing age
of several justices, there was a significant possibility of some
222. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
223. Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al.
224. See Richard L Berke & Katharine Q. Seele, Bush Pledges to Be President
for "One Nation," Not One Party; Gore, Conceding, Urges Unity, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2000, at Al.
225. See Frank Bruni & David E. Sanger, Bush, Taking Office, Calls for
Civility, Compassion and "Nation of Character," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2001, at
Al.
226. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Why It Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2000, at
A15; Jeffrey Rosen, The Next Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 22, 2000.
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retirements. Among the Court's conservatives, the most
likely to step down were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor. Both had already served lengthy tenures on the
Court, both were in their seventies, and both had faced some
significant health problems. Thus, when Bush won the
election, most people thought Rehnquist and O'Connor would
retire in the next four years.
But they did not. They may have concluded that, given
their personal roles in determining the outcome of the 2000
election, it would have been unseemly to retire before an
intervening presidential election, a stain on their legacies. Or
they may have believed that continuing to work full-time was
beneficial for their health and longevity. Or they may have
simply enjoyed being a justice more than whatever else they
would have done with their time in retirement. We can only
speculate.
But one point seems clear: Rehnquist's and O'Connor's
decisions to remain on the Court past 2004 were not
motivated by their legal policy goals. The outcome of the
2004 presidential election was quite close, turning on roughly
135,000 votes in the state of Ohio.227 And had Senator Kerry
prevailed, there was no guarantee that Rehnquist and
O'Connor could have continued to serve until 2009, as
Rehnquist's unfortunate passing in 2005 showed. Thus, if
they wanted to ensure that a Republican president appointed
their successors-the obvious strategy for best realizing their
legal policy preferences-both would have retired before 2004.
This is the critical insight of Judges and Their Audiences.
Contrary to the assumptions of the dominant models of
judicial behavior, goals unrelated to legal policy often
motivate judges, even at the Supreme Court. Judges are
human beings, and an extraordinarily complex array of
motives shape their behavior. What is more, we often
misunderstand the causes of their behavior because we are
predisposed to attribute others' actions to their attitudes,
preferences, or personalities. Frequently, and perhaps even
typically, the social situation exerts more influence on a
person's conduct than her individual disposition.
In Judges and Their Audiences, Baum alerts us to an
227. See Adam Liptak, In Making His Decision on Ohio, Kerry Did the Math,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P10.
568 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:48
important situational influence on judges' decisions: their
motive to maintain and enhance their self-esteem, and their
dependence on the approval of important audiences in that
endeavor. This is a significant insight, one that should alter
our conceptions of how courts actually work. But in many
respects, it is just a start. We know that several other
features of our cognitive interiors are likely to affect judges'
choices. In this sense, Baum has charted the course. The
task for the rest of us is to examine and document the myriad
other underappreciated aspects of the judicial situation. If we
succeed, we are apt to develop a much more realistic
understanding of why judges act as they do.
